

Introduction

This [document](http://fanwen.geren-jianli.org/1000450.html) [_ \(http://fanwen.geren-jianli.org/1000450.html\)](http://fanwen.geren-jianli.org/1000450.html) instructs personnel carrying out surveillance for the Integrated Operating Platform, or Integrated Joint Operating Platform (IJOP), on how to monitor the activities of those termed “pushed individuals” by the platform. This information is collected and uploaded to the platform by civil servants at all levels, including police officers and officials carrying out house visits as part of the “[Becoming Family](https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/?p=23686)” [_ \(https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/?p=23686\)](https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/?p=23686)” (访惠聚) campaign. IJOP pushes this data through the platform and state security organizations back to police stations and “Becoming Family” offices, which then pass along the information to the smaller units in which they live and work. The platform is highly efficient and grants statewide reach in its surveillance. According to one leaked [IJOP document](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558506-China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-14-English.html) [_ \(https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558506-China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-14-English.html\)](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558506-China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-14-English.html), between June 19th and 26th of 2017—just one week—the platform notified authorities about 24,412 individuals, resulting in 706 being detained as criminals and 15,683 being sent to receive “education and training.”

These instructions group these individuals into three categories of work: “backflow prevention” (防回流) targets those who have traveled to “26 key terrorism-related countries” (26个涉恐重点国家); “disconnected” (断通联) traces anyone suspected of using VPN software or other means of circumventing internet censorship; and those uncovered through “digging and shoveling” (挖减铲) have spent time in detention centers for terrorism-related charges. This terminology is related to the [comments](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/asia/china-xinjiang-uyghur-intellectuals.html) [_ \(https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/asia/china-xinjiang-uyghur-intellectuals.html\)](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/asia/china-xinjiang-uyghur-intellectuals.html) of religious affairs official Maisumujiang Maimuer, who called for a strategy of “digging up the roots” and unearthing those who might sow ideas of terrorism, extremism, and separatism among the population. Ultimately, these categories are ambiguous and allow authorities to surveil a wide range of people. For instance, in light of the multitude of reasons to report potential terrorists listed in an

official document entitled “Learning and Identifying 75 Religious Extreme Activities in Parts of Xinjiang” (<https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/chinese-sources/online-sources/identifying-religious-extremism/>),” people pushed by IJOP as a result of “digging and shoveling” might include those charged with anything from wearing certain clothes to refusing to playing team sports and participating in religious celebrations. Moreover, surveillance personnel are also instructed to monitor students studying abroad and to target individuals who have recently become citizens of Kazakhstan. This second instruction supports the claim made in Human Rights Watch’s report on IJOP (https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass#_ftn40): “The use of mass surveillance extends beyond Xinjiang and into the Turkic Muslim diaspora as authorities pressure them to provide detailed information about themselves, including their address, phone number, and school or workplace.”

The Model Essay Center (范文中心), where this document was originally posted, collects essays and texts relevant to the training of low-ranking cadres. Many documents are posted by anonymous officials, making establishing their provenance difficult. However, in this case, similar descriptions of IJOP policy implementation appear in other state documents, such as this 2019 report (<https://archive.fo/9TIRw#selection-607.0-641.66>) from Nilka County in Northern Xinjiang. These IJOP work instructions provide a window into how the platform carries out surveillance and what kinds of data it collects. The archived version is available here (<https://archive.fo/9TIRw>). For more on IJOP’s surveillance activities, see the material on Operation 9.13 translated in our page on The ‘Four Togethers’ and ‘Three Gifts’ Handbook (<https://xinjiangdocumentation.sites.olt.ubc.ca/?p=24535>).

Translation of “Integrated Operating Platform Work Instructions”:

一体化作战平台工作须知 - 范文中心 Translation

Contributed by Xinjiang Documentation Project

一体化作战平台工作须知 - 范文中心 Translation

Term Number

p. 1

Rural

p. 3

Original Document (PDF)

»

Contributed by Xinjiang Documentation Project

6. For those studying abroad, understand the back-
ground of the students, whether the schools
distance between the schools and the port of exit,
economic sources, the jobs of their parents, and
transferring money from mainland China.

7. 防回流分两类（1. 往返 26 个涉恐重点国家
为逾期人员，“防回流”人员未见面核查的属于
合境内现实表现给与结论。

7. Backflow prevention is divided into two categories:
terrorism-related countries, 2. Long-term resident
country for more than 30 days are overdue person
not yet been verified are classified as "on guard against
focuses on their activities overseas, combining the

8. “断通联”推送人员是指在中国使用的小众软件
VPN，类似国内微信一类的软件）、使用快牙

8. "Disconnection" pushed individuals refer to those
the instant contact software VPN used by people (or
other software), and individuals who use the Zapy

9. “挖减铲”是指涉看守所、涉恐等会对社会可

9. "Digging and shoveling" refers to individuals involved
may cause harm to society.

10. 推送后加入哈国国籍人员做布控防范但无
境后第一时间见面，了解情况是否排除嫌疑。

10. Individuals who have gained Kazakhstan citizenship
surveillance but hold off taking measures. Keep in
as they enter the country, and figure out whether

11. 推送人员要日见面了解情况，对不在本地
联系。

Document

←

←

Page 2 of 3

→

→

+

−

100%

⌂

“Integrated Operating Platform Work Instructions”:

一体化作战平台工作须知 - 范文中心

Contributed by Xinjiang Documentation Project

一体化作战平台工作须知 - 范文中心

archive.today Saved from http://fanwen.geren-jianli.org/1000450.html
webpage capture All snapshots from host fanwen.geren-jianli.org

Webpage Screenshot

范文中心

当前位置: 首页 >> 范文 >> 一体化作战平台工作须知

一体化作战平台工作须知

10-13

一体化作战平台推送人员基本内容须知

1、记住推送人员的期数。

2、推送人员的类型（防回流、“挖减铲”、断通联）

3、推送人员同行人员底数清、情况明。

4、出境时间、停留原因。

一体化作战平台工作须知 - 范文中心

Original Document (PDF) »

Contributed by XDP (Xinjiang Documentation Project)


Document |< < Page 1 of 3 > >| + - 94% []

Acknowledgment


Thanks to Dr. Darren Byler for his assistance contextualizing some of the language in this document.

Institute of Asian Research, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs

1855, C.K. Choi Building, West Mall
West Mall
Vancouver, BC Canada V6T 1Z1

 [_ \(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/\)](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) [_ \(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/\)](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
.

Find us on

 [_ \(https://twitter.com/ProjectXinjiang\)](https://twitter.com/ProjectXinjiang)
[_ \(javascript:;\)_](#) [_ \(javascript:;\)_](#) [_ \(javascript:;\)_](#)